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Introduction
Parties to copyright litigation are increasingly raising the First
Amendment as a potential limit to the scope of copyright rights.
Typically, the First Amendment is raised by defendants who claim
that their constitutional right to freedom of speech immunizes them
from copyright liability.1 On rare occasions, a plaintiff may use the
First Amendment as a sword to challenge a part of copyright law as
unconstitutional.2
While the use of the First Amendment in copyright litigation
may vary, the effectiveness of using the First Amendment does not.
Courts almost always reject the assertion that the First Amendment

places limits on the scope of copyright rights.' Thus, the First
Amendment provided little solace to Napster when it raised the First
Amendment as a defense to its copyright liability.! Similarly, the First
Amendment provided little help to Eric Eldred when he sought to
invalidate the recent twenty year extension to copyright terms as an
unconstitutional abridgement of speech.'
Courts do not reject First Amendment claims because they
believe that copyright law is immune from First Amendment scrutiny.
Instead, courts reject the claims because they believe that copyright
law already accounts for any First Amendment interests. Thus, courts
point to the fact that copyright law precludes protection for ideas and
allows for the "fair use" of expression as evidence that copyright law
1. See e.g. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Veeck v. S.
Bldg. Code Congress Intl. Inc., 241 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc grantedby, 2001
WL 1153486 (5th Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Worldwide Church of God v.
Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1486 (2001);
L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Penguin Books of U.S.A.,
Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1680 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Intell. Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
2.
See e.g. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aft'd, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C.C.
2001).
3.
See e.g. Veeck, 241 F.3d at 408-09 (rejecting First Amendment argument); Universal
City Studios, 273 F.3d at 445-60 (rejecting First Amendment argument); Worldwide Church of
God, 227 F.3d at 1115-16 (rejecting First Amendment argument); Penguin Books U.S.A., 55
U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1696 (rejecting First Amendment argument); LA. Times, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1472
(rejecting First Amendment argument); Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1295 (rejecting
First Amendment argument); but see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277
(I th Cir. 2001) (finding a preliminary injunction in a copyright case to be an unlawful prior
restraint that was "at odds with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright
law.").
4.
A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 922-23.
5.
Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3, affd, 239 F.3d at 375-77.
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incorporates First Amendment considerations into its doctrine.6

Having found that copyright law embodies First Amendment
interests, courts find it unnecessary, if not redundant, to entertain any
additional First Amendment arguments made by litigants.7
This position is hardly unreasonable. Copyright's refusal to
protect ideas8 would seem to adequately accommodate the First
Amendment's interest in creating a robust "marketplace of ideas."9
Moreover, the "fair use" doctrine,"0 which allows a party to use

another's expression in certain circumstances, would seem to provide
an added safety valve for those rare instances in which the use of
expression is justified by an overriding public interest.1 Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation

Enterprises came close to saying that copyright law fully accounts for
any First Amendment considerations,12 and commentators have often
come to the same conclusion.13
See e.g. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
6.
("In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to
copyright."); Religious Tech. Center .v. Henson, 182 F.3d 927, 927 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1105 (2000) (stating that the defendant's First Amendment "argument fails in light of
[the Supreme Court's decision in] Harper & Row, in which the Cdurt stated that the laws of the
Copyright Act already embrace First Amendment concerns."); A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at
922 (stating that "free speech concerns 'are protected by and coextensive with the fair use
doctrine' (quoting Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d
Cir. 1999)); L.A. Times, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1472 (stating that free speech concerns "are subsumed
within the fair use analysis").
Courts often manifest their unwillingness to consider First Amendment arguments by
7.
brusquely dismissing them. See e.g. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. at 3 (In dismissing the plaintiffs' First
Amendment argument, the court noted that "[tihe District of Columbia Circuit has ruled
definitively that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others"
(citing United Video, Inc. v. F.C.C., 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).); Intellectual
Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1295 (in rejecting the defendants' First Amendment argument, the
court stated that "the First Amendment does not give defendants the right to infringe on legally
recognized rights."); but see Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 445-60 (rejecting First
Amendment argument but only after careful consideration of the issue.)
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996) (providing that copyright protection does not extend to "any
8.
idea").
9.
Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 2.20 (1994)
(discussing the marketplace of ideas theory underlying freedom of expression).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996) (codification of the fair use doctrine).
10.
11.
See e.g. A&M Records, 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1799 (stating that "free speech concerns 'are
protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine"').
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (stating "that copyright's idea/expression dichotomy
12.
'strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting
free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression"').
See generally Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright: Cases and Materials
13.
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In this article, I briefly consider whether the common assumption
that the First Amendment places no limits on copyright law other
than those already embodied in copyright law is valid. I approach this
topic by searching First Amendment jurisprudence for broader
principles governing when a law violates the First Amendment. Once
I have identified these principles, I consider whether copyright law
fully incorporates these principles, or whether there needs to be
additional First Amendment restraints besides those built into
copyright law. While my analysis is admittedly preliminary and will
have to be developed in subsequent scholarship, I nevertheless argue
that there should be additional First Amendment restraints on
copyright law. Two recent cases illustrate how these additional
restraints might come into play.
I
Is There a There There? Identifying the Tension between
Copyright and the First Amendment
Copyright law both promotes and abridges speech, so it is not
always easy to tell whether a tension between copyright and speech
actually exists. Indeed, the Supreme Court can hardly be faulted for
describing copyright in Harper & Row as an "engine of free
expression." 4 By creating incentives for authors to create speech and
publishers to distribute it, copyright law undeniably furthers First

642 (5th ed., Lexis 1999) (stating that "courts and commentators generally agree that the
copyright law may accommodate First Amendment concerns by application of two established
copyright doctrines: the idea/expression dichotomy, and the fair use doctrine"); Marshall Leaffer,
Understanding Copyright Law 458 (3d ed., Matthew Bender 1999) (stating that "copyright law
optimizes First Amendment values by encouraging production of works of authorship without
prohibiting the free communication of facts and ideas embodied in these works"). There is a
considerable amount of scholarship considering the interplay of copyright law and the First
Amendment. While there are many scholars who conclude that copyright law adequately
accommodates First Amendment interests, there are also many dissenting voices. For some early
attempts to resolve the copyright/First Amendment conflict, see Paul Goldstein, Copyright and
the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970); Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
FirstAmendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970). For
more recent efforts, consult Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment
Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Mark A. Lemley
& Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke
L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale
L.J. 283 (1996); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1
(1987); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale L.J. 2431 (1998); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information
as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33
Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 665 (1992).
14.
471 U.S. at 558.
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Amendment interests.15 The fact that copyright bases these incentives
on private property rights (as opposed to government subsidization of
works) also supports First Amendment interests by ensuring that
speech production does not become captive to government control. 6
While copyright law furthers speech interests, it also hampers
them. By granting authors property rights in their expression,
copyright limits the rights of others to use the expression. 7 Thus, if
others want to reproduce or perform the expression, or if they want
to make a new work based on it, they must pay to use the work (if the
owner will grant them a license) or risk civil and potentially criminal
liability.18
One could certainly argue that these property rights in
expression have only a minimal impact on speech interests because
others are still free to use the ideas embodied in copyrightable
property. But this argument tends to underestimate the potential free
speech benefits of having access not only to ideas, but also to
expression. Indeed, if the First Amendment is intended to promote
enlightenment among citizens, 9 then certainly that goal might be
more easily achieved if works of authorship-books, software,
movies, music, artwork-could be freely copied, distributed,
performed and adapted. While access to ideas can also further this
enlightenment function, unlimited access to expression is cheaper and
easier than the often arduous process of extracting ideas from a work
and then recasting them in an entirely new expression.
15.
See id. (recognizing that "[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas").
16.
See Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway 232 (1994) (stating that "copyright

developed in the eighteenth century as a market alternative to royal sources of centralized
influence"); Benkler, supra n. 13, at 396-400 (discussing and critiquing Goldstein's view that
"extensive copyright protection will enhance free speech interests").
17.
See Volokh & McDonnell, supra n. 13, at 2431 (stating that "[c]opyright law restricts
speech. It restricts what writers may write, what painters may paint, what musicians may
compose. It prohibits not only slavish copying, but also creation of entirely new works, so long as

those works use-even if only in part-another's expression").
18.

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 (stating rights of copyright owner), 504 (civil remedies), 506

(criminal offenses) (1996).
19.
See e.g. Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 102 (1984) (referring to
the "enlightenment function" of free speech); Geoffrey R. Stone et. al., The First Amendment 9

(Aspen 1999) (discussing the "search for truth rationale for the protection of free expression").
20.
Moreover, even if new authors are permitted to use another's ideas, they may still be
reluctant to do so because of the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between uncopyrightable
ideas and copyrightable expression. Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/ExpressionDichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 Emory L.J.

393 (1989) (discussing First Amendment concerns raised by the vague and ad hoc nature of the
idea/expression dichotomy).
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Thus, one is caught in a balancing act of wanting, on the one
hand, to grant property rights in expression to promote speech, while
on the other hand, bemoaning the costs that these property rights
impose on freedom of expression. Of course, this notion of finding a
balance between property rights and public access is nothing new to
practitioners of intellectual property law. The task of striking this
balance lies at the heart of the entire field.21 Throwing the First
Amendment into the analysis changes the discussion in only one
significant way. Rather than leaving the balancing entirely to the
legislative process (as would be the case with the statutory
development of copyright law), the First Amendment provides a
judicially enforced check that can override whatever bargain
legislators may have struck."
This check on the political process is the essence of constitutional
law. In the First Amendment context, it ensures that free speech
interests will be protected against unlawful abridgements by the
political branches. Classically, this need arises when the majority
attempts to suppress dissenting voices (i.e., people who burn the flag
and groups like the Ku Klux Klan).23 It also arises when neutral
legislation unduly impacts on freedom of speech. The First
Amendment's role in checking copyright law is to ensure that neither
legislators making copyright law nor judges interpreting it allow
copyright to unduly trench upon these free speech interests.

21.
See e.g. Paul Goldstein, Copyright,Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines 6-8
(4th ed., Foundation Press 1999) (discussing how intellectual property law tries to strike a balance
between property rights and public access).
22.
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalizationof Technology Law, 15 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 529, 533 (2000) (noting how losers in the political process are likely to resort to
constitutional arguments because "[i]f you can persuade a court that what Congress has done is
unconstitutional, all the campaign contributions in the world are unlikely to help your
opponents").
23.
See Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (overturning a conviction for flag
desecration); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning the conviction of the leader
of the Ku Klux Klan for violation of the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute).
24.
See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (stating.
that time, place and manner restrictions can be invalidated if they fail to leave open "ample

alternative channels for communication of the information"); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding that a ban on all live entertainment was unconstitutional

for failing to leave open "ample alternative channels for communication of the information").
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II
How Much Is Too Much? What Makes a Law Violate
the First Amendment?
To say that the First Amendment can act as a check on copyright
law is not to answer the question of when this check should be
employed. It may be, as many courts assume, that a copyright law,
which allows for the use of ideas and provides for a fair use safety
valve, more than adequately protects any First Amendment concerns.
But how is one to know? The answer, it seems, would initially require
one to identify what makes a law violate the First Amendment and
then to examine whether copyright law passes muster under this
standard.
An examination of First Amendment jurisprudence reveals that
there are two primary theories for invalidating laws that impinge on
speech rights. First, laws or other governmental actions which censor
speech are considered offensive to the First Amendment and thus are
almost always struck down.25 This is particularly true if the
government's action is intended to suppress a particular message,
although it is also true if the action neutrally suppresses an entire
subject area.27 This principle is reflected in the rule that content-,based
laws are subject to strict scrutiny and rarely tolerated.' Second, laws
that do not have an illicit censorial motive, but which nevertheless
have a severe impact on speech, are also occasionally invalidated.29
25.
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commun. Commn., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving expression, consideration, and adherence. . . . Government
action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires utterance of a particular
message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential right.").
26.
See Tex., 491 U.S. at 414 ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
27.
See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Above] all else, the First
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan &
Gerald Gunther, First Amendment Law 193-97 (Foundation Press 1999) (noting that "[t]he Court
has generally scrutinized subject matter restrictions strictly").
28.
Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The vice of contentbased legislation-what renders it deserving of the high standard of strict scrutiny-is not that it
is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those
purposes.").
29.
See generally Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 58
(1987) (stating, with regard to content-neutral restrictions, that "[tihere is a strong correlation in
practice ...between the extent to which a challenged regulation actually interferes with the
opportunities for free expression and the Court's use of... strict, intermediate and deferential
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This principle is captured by the rule that sometimes invalidates
content-neutral regulations that fail to leave open "ample alternative
channels for communication of the information."3
Does copyright law, with its built-in idea/expression dichotomy
and fair use defense, adequately protect these concerns that the law
have neither an unlawful censorial purpose nor an unduly severe
impact? Perhaps it does. To begin with, copyright law hardly seems
censorial. While copyright liability does in some sense turn on the
content of the speech being communicated (i.e., only speech that uses
someone else's expression triggers liability), the rights and the
remedies available are unrelated to content (i.e., copyright protects
equally the Republican Party platform, Communist diatribes, and
pornography).3
One could also argue that copyright law's impact on free speech
is minimal because others remain free to use the ideas in a
copyrightable work, and fair use allows for the use of expression
when justified by an overriding public interest. Thus, it could be said
that the marketplace of ideas is none the worse because of copyright
law and, given copyright's speech-promotive effect, is in fact better
off.

While the above reasoning presents a powerful argument as to
why copyright law adequately protects speech interests, the following
cases suggest otherwise. The first case, Worldwide Church of God v.
Philadelphia Church of God,32 shows that neither a fair use analysis
nor the idea/expression dichotomy adequately guards against the
danger of private parties using copyright law for censorial purposes.
The second case, Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic,33 demonstrates

how a fair use analysis may fail to adequately appreciate the impact of
copyright liability on public access to speech.

review," with strict scrutiny being used for regulation with a "severe effect" on expression).
30.
See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (stating that time, place and manner restrictions in a public
forum must be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate governmental interest, and that they leave open ample

alternative channels for communication of the information").
31.
See e.g. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 855 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (In finding that obscene material could be
copyrighted, the court noted that the "legislative history of the 1976 Act reveals that Congress
intends to continue the policy of the 1909 Act of avoiding content restrictions on
copyrightability.").
32.
227 F.3d at 1110.
33.
54 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1453.
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III
Using Copyright Law to Censor:
Worldwide Church of God v. PhiladelphiaChurch of God
In one sense, all of copyright law is censorial. Copyright law,
after all, creates property rights in speech and then punishes parties
for using the protected speech without permission. But while
copyright may be censorial at its core, it is not usually perceived that
way. To begin with, even if copyright law is used to censor, it is
typically not the government that is using copyright rights to punish
expression, but rather private parties.34 Thus, if the First Amendment,
like most constitutional provisions, is concerned only with restraining
governmental power,35 then private censorship using copyright should
not give rise to concern, at least not to a concern of constitutional
magnitude.
In addition, copyright owners are not usually trying to censor
expression. Their goal is not to prevent public access to their works,
but rather to be paid for this access. Of course, in deciding how to
exploit their works, copyright owners may prefer some licensees over
others, or may prefer to exploit their work in one form but not
another. Still, the public will eventually gain access to the work.
Copyright's censorial nature is most evident when a copyright
owner does not choose to use his or her rights to exploit a work, but
rather to keep it off the market. This is admittedly an exceptional
situation. Most copyright owners are happy to allow their works to be
exploited as long as they are paid. Nevertheless, there are occasions
when either an individual or an organization prefers to keep a work
out of the public sphere and uses copyright rights to accomplish this
goal.36
34.

But see County of Suffolk v. First American Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179 (2d

Cir. 2001) (recent example of a governmental body suing for copyright infringement).
35. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course, a commonplace that
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech is a guarantee only against abridgement by
government.").
36. The Church of Scientology has been especially keen (though with little success) in
trying to use copyright to silence dissenters who reproduce Scientology works without
permission. See e.g. New Era Publications,Intl. v. Carol Publg. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d
Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990); New Era Publications, Intl. v. Henry Holt & Co.,
873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Relig. Tech. Cr. v. Netcom OnLine Com. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Religous Tech. Ctr. v.
F.A.C.TNET Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Colo. 1995); Relig. Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp.

1362 (E.D. Va. 1995). Some individuals who have tried to use copyright rights to protect their
privacy or reputations include Howard Hughes and J.D. Salinger. See Salinger v. Random House,
Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987) (Salinger successfully
stopped a biographer from reproducing parts of Salinger's unpublished letters.); Rosemont Enter.,
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In these latter situations, the decision to censor is still being
made by a private party and so arguably fails to raise any First
Amendment concerns. But the fact that this censorship occurs
through the use of governmentally-created property rights raises the
question of when governmental involvement should give rise to a
constitutional concern."
Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God38 is a
recent case that raises some of these issues. The plaintiff, the
Worldwide Church of God ("WCG"), is a nonprofit religious
organization that dates back to 1934.29 The WCG was trying to
suppress a book written by the Church's founder and longtime leader,
Herbert W. Armstrong. Armstrong was the Church's "undisputed
spiritual and temporal leader" and, within the Church, was known as
the "Pastor General with the spiritual rank of Apostle."' He wrote
the book "Mystery of the Ages" ("MOA") shortly before his death in
1986.1
At first, the WCG seemed to approve of Armstrong's book and
in fact distributed over a million copies to WCG employees and
viewers of WCG telecasts free of charge.4 ' Two years after
Armstrong's death, however, WCG decided to discontinue the
distribution of MOA because it thought the work no longer reflected
Church philosophy.43 The Church's leadership thought that the book
took positions on various social issues that were no longer consistent
45
with Church doctrine." The Church also found the book to be racist.
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967)
(plaintiff purchasing the copyrights on magazine articles in an effort to stop publication of
Howard Hughes biography).
37.
The United States Supreme Court acknowledges that the imposition of copyright
liability constitutes state action triggering the First Amendment. Thus, in Harper & Row, where a

private party brought suit for copyright infringement, the Court did not dismiss the defendant's
First Amendment argument on the ground that there was no state action, but rather on the ground
that copyright law already accounted for First Amendment interests. 471 U.S. at 555-60; see also
S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531-42 (1987) (analyzing the First
Amendment implications of trademark infringement); N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
265 (1964) (In finding state enforcement of a common law defamation action to be state action,
the Court stated that "[t]he test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.").
38.
227 F.3d at 1110.
39.
Id. at 1114.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. (Armstrong had also published MOA in serial form in The Plain Truth magazine,

which was distributed to approximately eight million people.).
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
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Just as WCG began removing MOA books from the shelves, a
new religious organization, founded by two former WCG ministers,
purported to strictly follow the teachings of Armstrong.46 Adherents
of this new movement, the Philadelphia Church of God ("PCG"),
believed that Armstrong's MOA was "a divinely inspired text" that
was "necessary for proper interpretation of the Bible." 47 They
required every member to read the book and all prospective
members
4
to read it "prior to their attendance at church services., 1
PCG managed to fill its need for MOA books for many years by
relying on copies that had been previously distributed by WCG.
Beginning in 1997, however, PCG began to print and distribute its
own copies of MOA.49 By the time of the litigation, PCG had
distributed approximately 30,000 copies in English and additional
foreign-language versions. 0 PCG received substantial contributions
from people who had received copies of the MOA, but it did not
directly charge for the book, which it freely distributed "to spread a
religious message."'"
WCG sued PCG for copyright infringement of the MOA and
sought to enjoin PCG from printing or distributing any additional
copies." A lower court rejected WCG's claims, finding in part that
PCG's use of MOA was a protected "fair use."53 The Ninth Circuit, in
a 2-1 decision, reversed, rejecting both PCG's fair use and First
Amendment arguments. 4
Despite the Ninth's Circuit's holding, Worldwide Church is
perhaps one of those rare instances in which a copyright owner's
property rights should have been limited because of First
Amendment concerns about preventing censorship. While the Ninth
Circuit might have been right as a matter of copyright law to reject
the defendant's fair use defense, it was arguably wrong as a matter of
First Amendment law to reject the defendant's free speech defense.
How could such a split between copyright law and the First
Amendment come about? The reason is that copyright law is focused
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id. at 1122 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
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on protecting a party's property rights, whereas the First Amendment
is focused on protecting speech. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was probably
right in rejecting the defendant's fair use defense because a "fair use"
analysis, while capable of factoring in First Amendment concerns, is
ultimately concerned with the impact of a defendant's use on the
plaintiff's property. Seen in this light, any use, such as the defendant's
use in Worldwide Church, which involved wholesale copying and
distribution of a plaintiff's work, is unlikely to be a "fair use." Not
only is the defendant copying the plaintiff's "entire work," but it is
also using the work to supersede the very market that the plaintiff
could (if it were ever so inclined) exploit.
In contrast, a First Amendment analysis focuses on the speech
implications of a plaintiff's assertion of copyright rights. Seen in this
light, the plaintiff in Worldwide Church was clearly trying to use
copyright law to censor. WCG was not asserting its rights to ensure
that it had the exclusive right to exploit MOA. WCG was instead
using its rights to ensure that MOA was never published by anyone.55
As the dissent noted, "WCG appears less interested in protecting its
rights to exploit MOA than in suppressing
Armstrong's ideas which
56
now run counter to church doctrine.,
Should such censorship be tolerated because it is prompted by a
private party and not the government? Arguably not. The cost to the
marketplace of ideas is the same whether the action is taken by a
private party or the government, and the private party's right to
control speech exists only because the government creates, defines
and enforces that right. Of course, all property rights are created by
the government, but the role of government is qualitatively different
when the government creates rights in speech itself. For instance,
Congress could not declare facts to be copyrightable and then expect
its decision to be immune from First Amendment scrutiny merely
because private parties would own the facts.57 It is thus one thing for
an owner of land (i.e., a mall) to refuse to allow his property to be
used for speech purposes,58 and quite another when a property owner
55.
WCG did claim that it had an interest in someday publishing an annotated version of
MOA, but it had not yet begun work on it. Id. at 1113. It is not clear whether this interest was real
or had been concocted to undermine the defendant's fair use argument.

56.

Id. at 1125 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).

57.
Indeed, in Harper & Row, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's First
Amendment challenge primarily because it found that copyright law had struck a "definitional
balance" with the First Amendment "'by permitting free communication of facts while still

protecting an author's expression."' Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (quoting Harper & Row, 723
F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
58.
See Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507 (reversing prior precedent and holding that labor picketers
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of speech refuses to allow others to use it.
Neither does the fact that others can use the ideas and facts in
Armstrong's MOA diminish any First Amendment concerns. While
this is not a situation where there is a classical merger of expression
and ideas (because there is only one or a few ways to express the
idea),59 it is a situation where granting public access to the expression
is critical if the public is to adequately appreciate the book's ideas.
PCG adherents could no more be told to rely on just the "ideas" in
Armstrong's book than Christians could be told to rely on a "Cliffs
Notes" version of the Gospels. 60
Of course, one might argue that concomitant with a First
Amendment right to speak is a right not to speak, and that WCG was
legitimately using its copyright for such a purpose. The Supreme
Court in Harper & Row described copyright as serving such a
purpose, 61 and the Ninth Circuit in Worldwide Church relied on this
logic in rejecting the defendant's First Amendment arguments. 62 But
in Harper& Row the plaintiff planned all along to publish the work in
question,63 so there was no long term danger that the public would be
deprived of access. In contrast, in Worldwide Church, copyright law
was being used to keep a work away from the public. Moreover, even
if copyright can sometimes legitimately serve an individual's First
Amendment interest in not speaking, Worldwide Church was hardly
an appropriate occasion to invoke this doctrine since the party
seeking to suppress the work was not the work's author, Armstrong,
but WCG.' WCG may have had every right to insist that copies do
did not have a First Amendment right to enter a private shopping center to picket).
59.
See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (lst Cir. 1967) (classic
case finding a merger of idea and expression when there was only a limited number of ways to
express an idea).
60.
See Worldwide Church, 227 F.3d at 1123 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (stating that
"altering or adding to MOA would defeat PCG's religious purpose because it believes that MOA
is a divinely inspired text").
61.
471 U.S. at 559 ("Moreover, freedom of thought and expression 'includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."') (quoting Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
62.
227 F.3d at 1117.
63.
471 U.S. at 542-43 (Plaintiff, Harper & Row, planned to publish the book, and had also
authorized Time magazine to print excerpts from the book.).
64.
This argument is complicated by the fact that WCG claimed that Armstrong wrote
MOA as a "work for hire." If that were true, then WCG would have been considered the "author"
of the work and the copyright rights would have vested in WCG. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
The lower court rejected this argument and the Ninth Circuit sidestepped it by concluding that,
even if the rights had initially vested in Armstrong, WCG was still the current copyright owner
because Armstrong had bequeathed his rights to WCG in his will. Worldwide Church, 227 F.3d at
1115.
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not imply WCG's endorsement of the text, but it is doubtful whether
WCG should have been able to invoke a constitutional right "not to
speak" as a basis for stopping the distribution of someone else's
expression."

IV
Using Copyright Law to Silence Too Much Speech:
Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic
Even when a copyright owner is not trying to censor a work, but
merely trying to be compensated for its exploitation, there may still
be a First Amendment concern if the copyright owner's demand for
payment affects speech rights in a way that is considered
unacceptable. Although any insistence on payment will have some
negative impact on the public's access to speech, in most instances
this is unlikely to raise any constitutional concern. Indeed, there is an
endless variety of content-neutral restrictions, which have some
negative speech impact but still easily pass constitutional muster. The
same would likely be true for the vast number of situations in which a
copyright owner insists on enforcing his rights, even if that comes at
the expense of public access.
Nevertheless, there are rare instances in which courts find that a
content-neutral speech restriction violates the First Amendment.
While it is hard to generalize about these cases, one commentator has
suggested that the likelihood of invalidation correlates with the extent
to which the regulation impacts on speech.66 The more severely a
regulation affects speech interests, the more likely it is to be
invalidated. This "impact" analysis is perhaps best captured in that
part of the content-neutral test which suggests that a regulation will
Even if the work was a work for hire, I would still be inclined to conclude that the First
Amendment interest in preventing censorship should trump WCG's competing "right not to
speak." If the "right not to speak" is intended to protect an individual's privacy interests, then
WCG would seem to have waived that right when it distributed millions of copies of MOA. If the
right is intended to protect a speaker from having to espouse a message that he or she disapproves
of, then that interest could be accommodaied 'by compelling PCG to put a disclaimer indicating
that WCG did not support PCG's distribution of Armstrong's work. Compare Wooley v.
Maynard,430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (forcing car owners to use license plates that proclaimed a
message they disapproved of violated their right not to speak) with Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.

Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980) (forcing mall owner to allow speech on its property did not
violate the mall owner's "right not to speak" when it could "expressly disavow any connection
with the message").
65.
Cf Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 87 (holding that mall owner's "right not to
speak" was not violated when it could disavow any connection with the speakers allowed on its
property).
66.
See Stone supra n. 29.
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be invalidated if it fails to leave open
67 "ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.
One type of impact that is occasionally considered improper
occurs when a law deprives parties of a cheap and easy means of
communication. In Schneider v. State of New Jersey, for example, the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a ban on leafleting, which
was intended to reduce littering, as unconstitutional. 6' Although the
Court never explicitly makes this point, commentators have
recognized that such a ban would be particularly problematic because
leafleting is one of the few means of mass communication that the
average person can afford. As commentators have noted, it is the
"poor man's printing press." 69 The Supreme Court was more open
about its concern with bans on inexpensive means of expression in
City of Ladue v. Gilleo. There, the Court invalidated a ban on
residential signs while noting, inter alia, that "[r]esidential signs are an
unusually cheap and convenient form of communication" and that
"persons of modest means ... may have no practical substitute., 7' A
similar concern was noted by the dissent in Members of City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, a case concerning a ban on signs posted on
public property, in which Justice Brennan urged the Court not to
discount the fact that this "medium of communication is particularly
valuable because71' it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a
wide audience.
The Los Angeles Times case might be a rare instance in which a
First Amendment concern with affordable access should override a
copyright owner's expectation of receiving the "customary fee. 72 The
plaintiffs were the publishers of the Los Angeles Times and the
Washington Post.73 Besides publishing daily papers, both plaintiffs

also operated websites where users could view current editions of the
papers at no cost, and access previous articles for a fee (the Times
67.
68.
69.

See supra n. 30 and accompanying text.
308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939).
See e.g. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. La., 1965 Sup. Ct.

Rev. 1, 30 (noting the Court's sensitivity to the importance of "the poor man's printing press")
(citing Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (noting that "[d]oor to door distribution of

circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people")).
70.

512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994).

71.

466 U.S. 789, 819 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336

U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) (In dissenting from a decision upholding a regulation

of loudspeakers on vehicles, Black noted that "[tihere are many people who have ideas they wish
to disseminate but who do not have enough money to own or control publishing plants,
newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show places.").
72.
L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
73.
Los Angeles Times, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1454.
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charged $1.50 to view an archived article; the Post charged between
$1.50 and $2.95 depending on the time of day that access was
sought)."
The defendants were the operators of the Free Republic website,
which allowed users an opportunity to post comments on current
events as well as on media coverage of those events.7" Users of the
Free Republic website routinely posted newspaper articles, including
articles from the plaintiffs' papers, which were then used to generate
discussion among the users. The plaintiffs contended that the
defendants were facilitating copyright infringement of their works
and that this "free" posting deprived them of archive fees as well as
advertising and licensing revenue.76
In rejecting the defendants' motion for summary judgment based
on a fair use defense, the district court did not seem bothered by the
fact that its ruling would force Free Republic users to pay for access
to the plaintiffs' archived articles. As the court noted, the fact that
there is a charge to see the plaintiffs' archived articles "merely
requires that Free Republic visitors pay a fee for viewing the
plaintiffs' articles just as other members of the public do."7 While the
court seemed to accept the defendants' argument that they were not
generating revenue from the plaintiffs' articles, it nevertheless
concluded that, "while defendants do not necessarily 'exploit' the
articles for commercial gain, their posting to the Free Republic site
allows defendants and other visitors to avoid paying the 'customary
price' charged for the works."78

Should this conclusion raise any constitutional concerns? Once
again, as a matter of copyright law, the court's decision seems sound.
Since most Free Republic commentaries were about the news events
themselves and not the media's coverage of the news, a good
argument could be made that there was no need for the users to
reproduce the plaintiffs' works (i.e., they could just recite the facts in
the articles).79 Moreover, this use cut directly into a market that the
plaintiffs were trying to exploit, and the plaintiffs had made their
works easily accessible, although not necessarily cheap, to the public.
Perhaps this is another instance, however, when First
Amendment concerns should trump the assertion of copyright rights.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1457, 1470.
1463.
1466.
1464.
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This is not because the plaintiffs are trying to prevent the public from
gaining access to their works, but because forcing users to pay the
"customary price" for this access might have a greater impact on
speech interests than the First Amendment should allow. The
argument would be based on the notion that the Internet is a
wonderful mode for democratic discussion, and that facilitating
Internet discussions of news events powerfully serves the First
Amendment interests of promoting enlightenment and informed selfgovernance."0 Admittedly, these interests could also be served if
visitors to the Free Republic site wrote up their own version of the
facts rather than lifting the plaintiffs' expression. But posting the
plaintiffs' articles may have been an "unusually cheap and
convenient" way for the Free Republic participants to initiate the
conversations that were the real focus of the website. If the impact on
the plaintiffs' property rights is only minimal (i.e., if users post only
individual articles), and if there is no indication that the website
replaces the need for users to purchase newspapers for complete news
coverage, then the First Amendment should override the plaintiffs'
copyright rights.
This First Amendment argument should not be overstated. If the
users were systematically copying from the same newspaper, or if the
website operators were financially benefiting from the postings (both
of which were contentious issues in the Los Angeles Times case), then
it would be less likely that the First Amendment should override the
plaintiffs' copyright rights. Nevertheless, it is worth identifying the
theoretical argument that the non-systematic copying and posting of
articles from papers, even if those articles might be available for a fee
at the papers' websites, might be of sufficient First Amendment value
to override the owner's interest in being compensated. This is so
particularly when the owner has already been compensated for the
initial sale of the newspaper and presumably will continue to generate
additional revenue from archival use of the works.

80.
Smolla, supra n. 9, at §§ 2.20, 2.04 (discussing marketplace of ideas and democratic
self-governance theories underlying free speech protection).
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V
Conclusion
The First Amendment clearly provides some check on copyright
rights. At a minimum, it is essential to ensure that Congress cannot,
with constitutional immunity, undo the very bargain that has made
copyright law palatable under the First Amendment. Thus, the First
Amendment stands as an obstacle if Congress were ever to provide
for property rights in ideas or to abolish legislatively the fair use
doctrine.'
But even if Congress leaves intact this delicate balance between
the First Amendment and copyright law, the First Amendment is still
necessary as a check on courts applying copyright law. For while the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine are perfectly
capable of incorporating any relevant First Amendment values, there
is still a danger that courts applying these doctrines will forget the
constitutional ramifications of their actions. Courts performing a fair
use analysis, for instance, may focus so intently on the property
implications of a defendant's actions that they may fail to appreciate
the speech implications.8"
Worldwide Church and Los Angeles Times illustrate how these
First Amendment interests can be overlooked. In both cases, the
courts dismissed the defendants' First Amendment arguments on the
assumption that copyright law embodies First Amendment interests,
but then failed to adequately consider these interests in their analyses
of copyright law.
The mistakes of Worldwide Church and Los Angeles Times can

81.
As recent events suggest, neither of these prospects is beyond the realm of possibility.
Commentators have argued that when Congress enacted the recent Digital Millennium Copyright
Act it failed to adequately provide for fair use privileges, and Congress has recently considered a
database protection bill that would create a property right in compiled factual information. See
e.g. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 673, 739 (2000) (stating that the "user safeguards" in the the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act "largely fail to achieve their stated goals"); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database
Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and
Technology, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 793 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, First Amendment concerns
raised by Congressional efforts to protect factual databases).
82.
Courts could hardly be faulted for failing to fully consider speech interests since they
have been instructed that the market effects of a use are the most important factor in a fair use
analysis and have been told that the central question is whether "the reasonable copyright owner
[would] have consented to the use." See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (describing "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" as the "single most
important element of fair use"); id. at 550 (quoting Professor Latman's description of the question
underlying a fair use analysis).
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be avoided only if courts understand the values embodied in the First
Amendment and make sure that those values are fully considered
whenever property rights in expression collide with freedom of
expression. Of course, courts could incorporate these values into their
fair use or idea/expression analysis and thus minimize the need for an
extensive First Amendment analysis."3 Still, the First Amendment
must always be there to remind courts that, as they keep one eye on
protecting property rights, they must keep the other on protecting
speech.

83.
For a recent example of a court doing this, see Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1265 ("As
we turn to the [fair use] analysis required in this case, we must remain cognizant of the First
Amendment protections interwoven into copyright law.").
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